Spot Markets¶

Bilateral Contracts¶
flowchart LR
b[Buyer]
br[Broker]
s[Seller]
b <--> br <--> s
b <--> s Direct exchange of energy between buyer and seller in a decentralized fashion
System operator is informed about trades that occur
Types¶
| Customized long-term contracts | OTC (Over the counter) | Electronic Trading | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consistently matches supply and offer bids | |||
| Flexible | ✅ | ❌ | |
| Private transactions | ✅ | ❌ | |
| Transaction costs | High (due to Broker) | Low | \(\approx 0\) |
| Speed | Fast (allows for trading “until last second”) | ||
| Trade volume | Large | Small | |
| Duration | Long | Small |
Auctions in Energy Pool¶
- All generation bids and consumption offers are placed at same time
- No one knows about others’ bids and offers
- Centralized market clearing decides bids and offers that are retained
- Eventually, the system operator is informed about the trades that occurred
Merit Order¶
- Consumption orders are ranked in dec price order
- Supply bids are ranked in inc price order


Social Welfare¶
Area between consumption and generation
Equilibrium point is that which allows to maximize social welfare
- Any buyer is to pay almost what they were ready to pay
- Any seller will get at least what they were ready to sell for

Market Clearing¶
Goal
- Schedule for all supply and demand offers
- Price at which market is cleared
Inputs
- All offers in the market are formulated in terms of quantity \(Q\) and price \(P\)
- Supply side
- Set of offers
- Maximum quantity for offer
- Price for offer
- Demand side
- Set of offers
- Maximum quantity for offer
- Price for offer
Decision variables
- Generation schedule
- Consumption schedule
Objective: Maximize social welfare
Constraints
- Non-negativity of supply and demand
- Balance of generation and consumption
- Generation and consumption within limits
Settlement Process¶
- Who should pay what?
- Who should get paid what amount?
Approaches¶
| Pay-as-bid | Uniform | |
|---|---|---|
| Every party pays/receives | whatever they bid | the same equilibrium amount |
| Advantages | Overcomes limitations of pay-as-bid Yields budget balance: sum of revenues equal to sum of payments | |
| Disadvantages | Supplier may receive 0 revenue, which won’t cover their fixed costs Consumers incentivized to lower bids; suppliers incentivized to increase bids |
Both approaches guarantee
- individual rationality: consumers will pay at most what they were ready to pay, and producers will receive at least what they were ready to receive
- Revenue adequacy: Sum of revenues \(\ge\) Sum of payments
Geographic Prices¶
Prices vary across various locations, as power has to flow through network involved
Exchanges capacity limitations
- There is a maximum amount of energy that can be exchanged from one location to another
- When this limit is reached, there is congestion and prices for connected areas will different
- Exchange capacity limitations are directly related to network constraints and operational practice
Approaches to handle exchange capacity limitations¶
| Zonal | Nodal | |
|---|---|---|
| System Operator | TSO | ISO |
| Market Operator | Ind. Market Operator | ISO |
| Offers | Market Products | Unit Capabilities |
| Clearing | Supply-demand equilibrium | UCED Problem |
| Network representation | Simplified | Detailed |
| Prices | Zonal | Nodal |
| Used in | Europe | US |
Market is not-budget balanced anymore, as the sum of consumer payments > sum of supplier revenues; difference defines congestion rent to be collected by system operator(s)
Approach 1: Split¶
Due to transmission constraints, the market has to be split and be treated as individual sub-markets
- Submarkets have their own supply-demand equilibrium
- Transmission-related offers: Extra (price-independent) consumption/generation offers representing the transmission from one zone to the next to be added

Approach 2: Flow-based coupling¶
Instead of boldly splitting market, one could instead acknowledge how power flows
This allows clearing a single market with geographically-differentiated prices

Regulation & Support Schemes¶
Grid parity = scenario when it is profitable to produce energy, ie Levelized Cost of Energy (cost of energy production) < market price
New energy generation tech may need support in order to reach grid parity
- Regulation is an instrument for policy makers to support their integration in the market
- Support schemes consist in financial support to make them competitive in the market
These have impact on participant revenues, offering strategies, market outcomes
Types
| FIT | FIP | CFT | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning | Feed-in-tariff | Fixed Feed-in-Premium | Contract for difference/ Sliding Premium |
| Implication | Guaranteed price | Fixed support regardless of market revenue | Compensation of difference between guaranteed price and market revenue |
| Blue: Support revenue Green: Market Revenue | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() |
| Implication for producer | Just ensure you get scheduled Bid as low as possible |
Safe policy to guarantee non-negative equilibrium prices: FIP or CfD at 0


